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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004, the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) was amended to define marriage as ‘the union of a man 
and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life’.1 A panicked 
response to the wave of Australian couples intending to travel overseas to take advantage of 
recently legalised same-sex marriage in Canada,2 the amendment definitively affirmed marriage 
as an exclusively heterosexual institution, and precluded the recognition of same-sex marriages 
entered into overseas.3 It was deemed ‘one of the most unfortunate pieces of legislation that has 
ever been passed by the Australian Parliament’ by former Family Court of Australia Chief 
Justice, Alastair Nicholson.4 In the decade since, there has been a tumult of interest on both 
sides of the same-sex marriage debate.5 
 Whilst Federal and State Bills seeking to extend marriage to same-sex couples have 
been routinely defeated, the popular pressure for marriage equality has swelled significantly. 14 
countries and several sub-national jurisdictions have now legalised same-sex marriage.6 
Notably, New Zealand did so in April this year – the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) 
Amendment Bill 2013 was passed with a convincing 77-44 vote – making it the first in the Asia-
Pacific region. Two potentially landmark cases are currently being heard in the United States 
Supreme Court, to be decided by the end of June 2013. One considers the constitutionality of 
California’s Proposition 8 which bans gay marriage; the other a challenge to the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act (‘DOMA’) which defines marriage as between only a man and a woman for 
                                                       
* University of Sydney Law School, Honours 2013. Information in this paper is current as at 31 May 2013. 
1 s 5(1), as amended by Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) sch 1 item 1. 
2 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 2004, 29396 (Philip Ruddock, 
Attorney-General). In Canada, court decisions starting in 2003 legalised same-sex marriage in 8 out of 10 provinces 
and 1 of 3 territories. See, eg, EGALE Canada Inc v Attorney-General (Canada) (2003) 13 BCLR (4th) 1; Halpern v 
Attorney-General (Canada) (2003) 225 DLR (4th) 529; Hendricks v Procureur Général (Québec) [2002] RJQ 2506; 
Dunbar v Yukon (2004) 122 CRR (2d) 149. The constitutionality of a same-sex inclusive marriage definition was 
upheld in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698. In 2005, the Civil Marriage Act (S.C. 2005, c.33) was 
enacted, providing a gender-neutral marriage definition. 
3 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 88EA, as amended by Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) sch 1 item 3. 
4 The Hon Alastair Nicholson, ‘The Legal Regulation of Marriage’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 
556, 556. 
5 Note that the broader issue of ‘marriage equality’ also concerns the rights of transgender and intersex persons to 
marry, but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6 As at 21 May 2013, provided that Uruguay and New Zealand enact legislation approved by their lawmakers; Laura 
Smith-Park, ‘UK’s House of Commons approves same-sex marriage’, CNN (online), 21 May 2013 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/21/world/europe/uk-same-sex-marriage/>. 
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federal purposes, and asserts that no state shall be required to recognize inter-state same-sex 
marriages.7 
 
Capturing the spirit of the dissension is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s statement that DOMA 
effectively creates ‘two kinds of marriage: the full marriage, and then this sort of skim 
milk marriage’.8 In the United States, state laws determine who is married, but federal law 
determines the entitlements of married couples, and denies same-sex couples a huge range of 
federal benefits which are afforded to their heterosexual peers. 9  
 
In Australia, same-sex couples are not subject to such substantive inequities. A raft of 
legislative reforms in 2008 extended equal rights in areas such as veteran affairs, social security, 
employment, immigration, workers’ compensation, superannuation and income tax.10 However, 
Justice Ginsburg’s analogy befits the Australian context, where inequality persists in 
relationship recognition. So long as same-sex couples are denied access to the socially-resonant 
institution of marriage, two classes of relationship are perpetuated; heterosexual unions as ‘full-
cream’, and same-sex relationships as ‘skim-milk’. Mere legislative equality is nutritious 
enough, but a watery substitute for symbolic recognition.  
 
This paper explores how the seemingly unstoppable issue of same-sex marriage will play out in 
Australia. The next section outlines the central constitutional issue; namely, whether Federal 
Parliament is empowered to legislate for same-sex marriage; and how this question will come 
before the High Court. The paper then analyses different approaches to constitutional 
                                                       
7 Hollingsworth v Perry No. 12-144 (9th Cir) considers California Constitution Art. 1, § 7.5; United States v Windsor 
No. 12-307 (2nd Cir) considers Defense of Marriage Act 1 U.S.C § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. II 1996).  
8 United States v Windsor No. 12-307 (2nd Cir) (27 March 2013, oral arguments). 
9 Andrew Koppelman, ‘Dumb and Doma: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional’ (1997) 85 Iowa 
Law Review 1; Adam Liptak and Peter Baker, ‘Justices Cast Doubt on Benefits Ban in U.S. Marriage Law’, The New 
York Times (online), 27 March 2013 < http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/us/supreme-court-defense-of-marriage-
act.html>. 
10 The Federal Government acted on the Australian Human Rights Commission (formerly HREOC) report; HREOC, 
National Inquiry into Discrimination against People in Same-Sex Relationships: Financial and Work-Related 
Entitlements and Benefits ‘Same-Sex: Same Entitlements’ (2007); that had identified 58 Federal Acts that 
discriminated against same-sex couples. The reforms comprised: the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial 
Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth), The Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws 
– General Law Reform) Act 2008 (Cth), and the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment Commonwealth Laws – 
Superannuation) Act 2008 (Cth).  
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interpretation; their strands, merits, drawbacks and past application; to determine how the 
question might be resolved under each, and whether this represents an appropriate course. 
Section 3 looks at originalism, Section 4 at non-originalism, and Section 5 at ‘middle-way’ 
approaches. 
  
2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
 
While questions of public opinion and social policy carry the political debate, there can be no 
challenge in the High Court based on human rights. This is because Australia does not have a 
Bill of Rights, unlike countries such as Canada where legal reforms were aimed at ensuring 
consistency with equality provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There 
are thus two options: same-sex legislation at the federal level, or at the state level. Both 
eventualities are discussed below. In either case, a High Court determination is inevitable, 
because the central (and highly contentious) issue is the scope of the Marriage Power contained 
in the Constitution s 51(xxi): 
 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, 
order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to…marriage. 
 
Ultimately, the question for the High Court will be: ‘Does the Marriage Power give Federal 
Parliament power to legislate for same-sex marriage?’ How the Court answers this question 
depends on their interpretation of the constitutional term ‘marriage’, the scope of which has 
never been thoroughly canvassed. So far there have been judicial intimations,11 but no direct 
High Court authority on whether s 51(xxi) is broad enough to encompass same-sex marriage.12 
The answer is crucial, for if the Court considers that Federal Parliament does have power, any 
                                                       
11 See especially Re Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 553 where McHugh J said in obiter that 
‘arguably “marriage” now means, or in the near future may mean, a voluntary union for life between two people to 
the exclusion of others’. 
12 Speculating as to how the High Court will decide is further complicated by recent appointments; Gaegeler J 
replaced Gummow J in October 2012, Keane J replaced Heydon J in March 2013. The current Bench has not made 
any constitutional rulings that may indicate the dominant approach to constitutional interpretation. 
 5 
federal legislation on the topic could stand. The States would have great difficulty in legislating 
for same-sex marriage, because of the risk of inconsistency (discussed below in Section 2.1.2). 
On the other hand, the Court’s rejection of Federal competence would more readily facilitate 
State same-sex marriage legislation, but would hamper the pursuit of uniform federal marriage 
regulation. The result is sure to hinge on the critical interplay of constitutional factors and 
political impetus at the federal and state levels. 
Academics have taken disparate tacks to interpreting s 51(xxi). In 2008 Geoffrey 
Lindell concluded that, though difficult and probably unlikely at the time, it would be ‘by no 
means impossible, given the inherent flexibility of the relevant principles of constitutional 
interpretation’ to hold that Federal Parliament does have the power to legislate for same-sex 
marriage.13 Brock and Meagher submit that the High Court would find such legislation valid if 
they interpret ‘marriage’ as a constitutionalised ‘legal term of art’;14 Meagher further asserts that 
such legislation would be invalid under the ‘connotation and denotation’, moderate originalist 
and non-originalist approaches.15 George Williams, however, believes that the High Court, by 
taking an evolutionary approach, is more likely than not to hold that Federal Parliament does 
have power.16 Jeffrey Goldsworthy asserts that it is possible to make a respectable argument 
consistent with originalism, through a ‘non-literal, purposive approach’, that the Marriage 
Power does support same-sex marriage legislation.17 
However, the dearth of High Court attention calls for a more comprehensive analysis of 
the spectrum of interpretive approaches that might be applied to s 51(xxi). It is not suggested 
that the High Court’s determination will turn on an explicit advance prescription of 
methodology. This has not been decisive in past constitutional jurisprudence;18 indeed, Gleeson 
CJ and Gummow J have portended the dangers of doing so, highlighting the myth of the one 
                                                       
13 Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Constitutional Issues Regarding Same-Sex Marriage: A Comparative Survey – North America 
and Australasia’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 27, 40. 
14 Margaret Brock and Dan Meagher, ‘The legal recognition of same-sex unions in Australia: A constitutional 
analysis’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 266, 276. 
15 Dan Meagher, ‘The times are they a-changin’? – Can the Commonwealth parliament legislate for same sex 
marriages?’ (2003) 17 Australian Journal of Family Law 1. 
16 George Williams, ‘Can Tasmania Legislate for Same-Sex Marriage?’ (2012) 31(2) The University of Tasmania 
Law Review 117, 124. 
17 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law 
Review 677, 699. 
18 Eg, the originalism/progessivism debate was not decisive in the Gleeson Court: Dan Meagher, ‘Guided by Voices? 
– Constitutional Interpretation on the Gleeson Court’ (2002) 7 Deakin Law Review 261, 289. 
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‘revelatory theory’.19 Nevertheless, each Justice will apply a theory of constitutional 
interpretation (whether articulated or not), to ultimately determine the issue at hand. 20 
This paper will show that a number of interpretive approaches conduce to reading s 
51(xxi) as including the power to legislate for same-sex marriage. A non-originalist approach 
does so by taking account of contemporary values such as human rights, and the practical need 
for uniform regulation of the institution of marriage. A strong argument can be made that this 
approach is warranted, given the vastly different social landscapes of 1900 and 2013. On the 
other hand, original intent has always had a primary place in construing statutory terms, and 
particularly the Constitution. Originalism does not, however, readily accommodate same-sex 
marriage, except by means of the ‘legal term of art’ approach. Addressing the tension between 
originalism and non-originalism, this paper will also demonstrate that on moderate originalist 
approaches, which advert to the Framers’ intentions without being constrained by anachronistic 
assumptions, s 51(xxi) may be interpreted as granting Federal Parliament the power to legislate 
for same-sex marriage. 
 
2.1 HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION WILL COME ABOUT 
 
As mentioned above, a High Court challenge will be prompted in one of two ways; by the 
passing of federal or state legislation. As a preliminary matter it is important to chart how each 
scenario will play out, because of the ramifications for Australia’s recognition of same-sex 
marriage. 
 
2.1.1 Federal Legislation 
 
The first option would involve Federal Parliament legalizing same-sex marriage by altering the 
Marriage Act to define ‘marriage’ as a union between two people (not just a man and a woman). 
                                                       
19 Murray Gleeson, “Foreword”, in Michael White and Aladin Rahemtula (eds), Queensland Judges on the High 
Court (Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2003) viii-ix; SGH Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 188 
ALR 241, 252 (Gummow J). 
20 The Honourable Justice Michael Kirby has argued that for purpose of transparency, these theories should be 
articulated: The Hon Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor 
Worship?’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 5. 
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This would undoubtedly provoke a High Court challenge regarding Parliament’s competency to 
make such a law under s 51(xxi).21 
The likelihood of this option playing out in the immediate future is slim. In reply to 
criticism that Australia is lagging behind New Zealand, Prime Minister Julia Gillard affirmed 
her anti-same-sex marriage stance,22 though Members of the Labor Party are allowed a 
conscience vote on the issue. Opposition Leader Tony Abbott has similarly affirmed the 
Coalition’s position that marriage be confined to heterosexual couples, though he conceded that 
a conscience vote may be allowed after the September 14 Federal election. However, even as 
support grows amongst Coalition Members, it is doubtful that the party room position will 
change.23 While Greens Senator Sarah Hanson-Young reintroduced the Marriage Equality 
Amendment Bill 2013 in March this year, its rejection last year was forceful; defeated 98 to 42 
in the House of Representatives. In May, Greens deputy leader Adam Bandt indicated his 
intention to have the Bill brought up for vote in the House of Representatives on 6 June 2013. 
Aimed more at elevating the issue pre-election to clarify for voters where each Member stands, 
the Bill would likely fail given Tony Abbott’s present refusal to allow Coalition Members a 
conscience vote. 24  In April, Independent Tony Windsor called for a national poll on same-sex 
marriage to be held on Federal election day.25 Supported by the Greens and other cross-
                                                       
21 A constitutional challenge could be mounted by the States. ‘Standing’ has also potentially been widened by a 
recent High Court decision which accepted an individual’s challenge to the constitutionality of the school chaplaincy 
scheme, on the grounds that his contentions were supported by the Attorneys-General intervening on behalf of 
Victoria and Western Australia: Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 288 ALR 410, 447 (Gummow and Bell JJ) and 
414 (French CJ). Alternatively, the Commonwealth Attorney-General could seek a declaration of validity in relation 
to the federal legislation to bring the issue before the High Court: Attorney-General (Cth) v T&G Mutual Life Society 
Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161. 
22 (Author unknown), ‘Gillard, Abbott unmoved by NZ gay marriage vote’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 17 
April 2013 < http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/gillard-abbott-unmoved-by-nz-gay-marriage-vote-
20130417-2i0sv.html>.  
23 Eg, NSW Premier Barry O’Farrell came out in support of same-sex marriage legislation the day after the New 
Zealand Parliament voted to change its national laws, and challenged Tony Abbott to allow a conscience vote on the 
issue: Sean Nicholls, ‘O'Farrell comes out for same-sex marriage’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 19 April 
2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/ofarrell-comes-out-for-samesex-marriage-20130418-
2i31b.html>. However, Tony Abbott has predicted that if this were allowed, only a dozen (at most) Coalition MPs 
would vote in favour of same-sex marriage: Michael Gordon, ‘No revisiting gay marriage: Abbott’, The Age (online), 
4 May 2013 < http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/no-revisiting-gay-marriage-abbott-20130503-
2iygv.html>.   
24 Mark Kenny, ‘Greens press for immediate gay marriage vote’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 9 May 2013 
< http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/greens-press-for-immediate-gay-marriage-vote-20130509-
2j9hr.html>. 
25 Ben Packham, ‘Cool reaction from government, opposition to gay marriage referendum plan’, The Australian 
(online), 29 April 2013 < http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/cool-reaction-from-government-
opposition-to-gay-marriage-referendum-plan/story-fn59niix-1226631460091>.  
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benchers, Windsor’s call was rejected by Tony Abbott as ‘muddying the waters’.26 It was met 
with apprehension by Australian Marriage Equality national convenor Rodney Croome and 
George Williams, who cautioned that the surrounding debate would be ‘divisive and 
irrational’.27 Even if a poll goes ahead, it is more likely to take the form of a plebiscite than 
referendum. The Government would therefore not be bound to support the result on such a 
‘conscience’ issue, and the constitutional issue would remain unresolved.28  
 
2.1.2 State Legislation 
 
The second option would involve the States enacting marriage equality legislation. Following 
attempts in Tasmania and South Australia,29 the NSW State Marriage Equality Bill 2013 was 
introduced by a cross-party working group of Coalition, Labor, an Independent and Greens 
Members of Parliament. It is currently the subject of a Legislative Council inquiry, with The 
Committee on Social Issues due to report on its viability and desirability in July 2013. 
 Clearly the States have the power to pass laws with respect to marriage; s 51 powers are 
concurrent, and the States have plenary power to make laws for the ‘peace, welfare, and good 
government’ of the State.30 Indeed, before referral to the Commonwealth in 1961, the States 
each administered their own marriage systems. It is well accepted that same-sex legislation at 
the Federal level is more appealing, as it provides for uniform administration, but same-sex 
marriage advocates have resorted to State-based legislation in light of staunch Federal 
resistance. If the Bill is enacted, it will be challenged in the High Court, either by an individual 
whose legal rights or interests are actually affected by the law, or the Federal or a State 
                                                       
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid; George Williams has said that: ‘[National polls of this kind] attract extreme views and give licence to the 
media to report them. This would likely include absurd and offensive claims that vilify gay and lesbian people. There 
are real dangers in holding a vote on contentious moral topics like gay marriage, abortion and euthanasia.’: George 
Williams, ‘Windsor push could open can of worms’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 30 April 2013 
<http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/windsor-vote-push-could-open-can-of-worms-20130429-2iosl.html>. 
28 Williams, ‘Windsor push could open can of worms’, above n 27. 
29 The Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2012 (Tas) was voted down in the State’s upper house in September 2012. The 
Marriage Equality Bill 2012 (SA) will be considered by Parliament this year. 
30 Williams, ‘Can Tasmania Legislate for Same-Sex Marriage?’, above n 16, 125. 
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government.31 As with a challenge to federal legislation, the Court would have to answer the 
question, ‘Does Federal Parliament have the power to legislate for same-sex marriage under the 
Marriage Power?’ 
If the Court considered that Federal Parliament did have power, the next issue would be 
whether (or to what extent) the State law is rendered inoperative by virtue of the Constitution s 
109, which provides that a State law is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency with a 
Commonwealth law. It is unclear how this would play out. 
Direct inconsistency occurs when State laws ‘alter, impair or detract from the operation 
of a law of the Commonwealth’.32 To avoid this, State same-sex marriage legislation could not 
provide for federal recognition of State marriages, or allow for same-sex marriage whilst a 
person is already married under the Marriage Act. Ultimately, the State legislation would need 
to be very circumscribed, so much so that it calls into question its very legal desirability. Patrick 
Parkinson has convincingly argued that State ‘same-sex marriage’ would effectively be a hybrid 
institution, legally distinct from ‘marriage’ and with dire consequences in the case of inter-state 
recognition and dissolution.33 Even if the State laws were self-contained, an argument of 
inconsistency could be made that the existence of two kinds of marriage (Marriage Act and 
State same-sex) would be ‘misleading or confusing’ or would diminish the symbolic importance 
of marriage in the federal sense.34  
Indirect inconsistency occurs when State laws intrude upon a ‘subject matter of a 
Federal enactment that…was intended as a complete statement of the law governing a particular 
matter or set of rights and duties’.35 Some contend that the comprehensive nature of the 
Marriage Act provisions regulating validity and formation of marriage indicate an intention to 
                                                       
31 The individual might be a person who is a party to a same-sex marriage recognized under a State law, who 
challenges the validity of that marriage down the track: Williams, ‘Can Tasmania Legislate for Same-Sex Marriage?’, 
above n 16, 132. If an individual challenge is supported by an Attorney-General intervener, ‘the questions of standing 
(could) be put to one side’: see Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 288 ALR 410, 447 (Gummow and Bell JJ) and 414 
(French CJ). Another possibility is that the High Court gives an advisory opinion: Geoffrey Lindell, Answers to 
Questions on Notice to Standing Committee on Social Issues (NSW), Inquiry into Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW, 
19 March 2013, 5-6. 
32 Victoria v Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR 618, 630 (Dixon J). 
33 Patrick Parkinson, Submission No 102 to Standing Committee on Social Issues (NSW), Inquiry into Same Sex 
Marriage Law in NSW, 2 February 2013.  
34 Brock and Meagher, above n 14, 276. 
35 Victoria v Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR 618, 630 (Dixon J). 
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cover the field of all forms of marriage including same-sex marriage.36  Others argue that the 
2004 amendments explicitly narrowed the scope of the Marriage Act to heterosexual marriage.37 
This is a difficult position to take, because it requires an argument that Parliament’s intention 
changed in 2004; that it previously did intend to cover the field. Some posit the significance of 
the Marriage Act only seeking to prevent recognition of same-sex marriage in respect of unions 
under foreign law (s88EA);38 if Parliament had wanted to preclude domestic same-sex marriage, 
it could have explicitly done so. However, the more convincing argument is that such a 
provision was thought unnecessary, as foreign law would not govern such marriages.39 That 
Federal Parliament intended to cover the field is also supported by the incongruity of domestic 
and foreign same-sex marriages being treated differently under the Marriage Act. The 
Explanatory Memorandum confirms the agenda to ‘protect the institution of marriage by 
ensuring that…same sex relationships cannot be equated with marriage’.40 Moreover, even if 
there is no inconsistency at present, the Commonwealth could explicitly legislate its intention to 
cover the field of marriage, thus rendering the State laws inoperative. 
On the other hand, if the High Court considered that s 51(xxi) does not include power to 
legislate for same-sex marriage, the only inconsistency argument that could be made is that the 
creation of other personal relationships by State law would by their nature undermine the 
primacy of the legal institution of heterosexual marriage recognized by the Marriage Act. This 
is supported by the Marriage Act Case which held that the Marriage Power would include the 
incidental power to deny validity to bigamous marriages.41 In the case that Federal Parliament 
                                                       
36 Brock and Meagher, above n 14, 268; Geoffrey Lindell, ‘State legislative power to enact same-sex marriage 
legislation, and the effect of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) as amended by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth)’ 
(2006) 9(2) Constitutional Law and Policy Review 25, 28; see especially Patrick Parkinson, above n 33, 3 where he 
referred to Taylor J’s statement in Attorney-General (Vic) v The Commonwealth (1962) (‘Marriage Act Case’) 107 
CLR 529, 558 that, ‘The Marriage Act 1961 is a comprehensive statute enacted pursuant to the power of the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth to make laws for the peace order and good government of the Commonwealth with 
respect to “Marriage”. It contains a great many provisions and its main purpose is to establish a uniform marriage law 
throughout the Commonwealth.’ 
37 Williams, ‘Can Tasmania Legislate for Same-Sex Marriage?’, above n 16, 130. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Geoffrey Lindell, ‘State legislative power to enact same-sex marriage legislation, and the effect of the Marriage 
Act 1961 (Cth) as amended by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth)’, above n 36, 31. 
40 Explanatory Memorandum, Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), General Outline. 
41 Attorney-General (Vic) v The Commonwealth (1962) (‘Marriage Act Case’) 107 CLR 529, 557–558. The 
incidental legislative power includes the express grant in s 51(xxxix) which enables Parliament to legislate with 
respect to ‘matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament…’ or the 
implied power which attaches to each individual grant in s 51: Re Dingjan; ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 
352 (Toohey J). 
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does not have the legislative scope, a uniform federal marriage scheme could nevertheless be 
developed by the States referring power under s 51(xxxvii). This, however, rests upon a 
willingness of the Federal government and all State governments to achieve this outcome. The 
final possibility is a referendum under the Constitution s128 to amend s 51(xxi) to allow Federal 
Parliament to legislate for same-sex marriage.  
 
Taking a step back, how the prospective inconsistency debate plays out is critical to the 
operativeness of any State legislation, but less important in the long-term. The goal of State 
legislation is largely political; it is intended to demonstrate the entrenchedness of the same-sex 
marriage cause, and put pressure on the Federal government to amend the Marriage Act. This 
section has demonstrated that regardless of how it comes about – by the Federal Government 
amending the definition of marriage in the Marriage Act to embrace same-sex relationships, or 
by State same-sex marriage legislation inciting a claim of inconsistency – the question of the 
scope of the Marriage Power will come before the High Court. As Federal and State 
governments face mounting domestic and international pressure to legalise same-sex marriage, 
adjudication looms ever closer. 
 
3 ORIGINALISM 
 
Let us now turn to the first interpretive technique that the High Court might use to construe s 
51(xxi). Under originalism, the orthodox approach to constitutional interpretation, the 
fundamental object is to ascertain the meaning of the term ‘marriage’ at the date of enactment, 
1900.42 The Court is not to ‘vary its construction from time to time to meet the supposed 
changing breezes of popular opinion.’43 Given the chronistic emphasis, it is difficult to see how 
an originalist reading supports the inclusion of same-sex marriage under the Marriage Power, or 
is even appropriate to interpreting it. This section discusses the strands of literalism, 
                                                       
42 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 1, 8, 12; Leslie 
Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (The Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008), 21. 
43 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and Merchant Service Guild (1912) 15 CLR 586, 592 
(Griffith CJ). 
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‘connotation and denotation’, textualism and intentionalism, and ‘legal term of art’. It suggests 
that only the latter facilitates a reading of s 51(xxi) that is consistent with same-sex marriage. 
 
3.1 LITERALISM 
 
Ushering in the Australian era of literalism, The Engineers Case in 1920 emphasised textual 
primacy, but the majority also stated that the Constitution is to be read ‘naturally in the light of 
the circumstances in which it was made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the common 
law, and the statute law which preceded it’.44 Consisting of just a single word, s 51(xxi) should 
not be read narrowly,45 but at the same time, must be read as fully descriptive of the subject 
matter. When elucidated by reference to context, it becomes clear that there is no room for 
same-sex marriage. 
In terms of common law, Lord Penzance’s definition in the 1866 English case Hyde v 
Hyde and Woodmansee still resonated in Australia in 1900; marriage was seen as a ‘voluntary 
union for life between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others’.46 This was the 
definition implicitly adhered to in the Marriage Act Case; all judges assumed that marriage 
referred to the institution concerning a ‘husband and wife’.47 However, while McTiernan J 
would have confined its meaning to monogamous marriage,48 Windeyer J considered that the 
legislative power might extend to marriages differing essentially from the monogamous 
Christian tradition.49 However, only recent judicial discussion has acknowledged the changing 
idea of marriage and family as encompassing same-sex relationships. In Re Wakim; ex parte 
                                                       
44 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 152. 
45 Bank of NSW v The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 333 (Dixon J). 
46 [1866] LR 1 PD 130, 133. See also, John Quick and Robert Garran, The annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth (Angus and Robertson, 1901), 608-609 which states that ‘[m]arriage as a head of legislative 
power…denotes that form of union or cohabitation between man and woman which is entered in accordance with the 
conditions and formalities prescribed by law, and which confers a recognized status both on the parties and on their 
children.’; Re F; Ex parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376, 399 where Brennan J stated that marriage as a subject of legislative 
power embraces ‘those relationships which the law…recognises as the relationships which subsist between husband, 
wife and the children of the marriage’; R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, 392 where Brennan J commented that the 
traditional Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee definition ‘has been followed in this country and by this Court’. This was 
ultimately the definition adhered to in Re Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. 
47 (1962) 107 CLR 529. 
48 Ibid, 549. 
49 Ibid, 576-577 (adverting to domestic recognition of polygamous marriages recognized in overseas jurisdictions, 
and Aboriginal tribal marriages). 
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McNally (1999), McHugh J said in obiter that ‘arguably “marriage” now means, or in the near 
future may mean, a voluntary union for life between two people to the exclusion of others’.50 In 
Re Patrick: An application concerning contact, Guest J of the Family Court said that in 
recognising a ‘family’ the ‘issue of…homosexuality is, in my view, irrelevant’.51 
In terms of statute law, it was not until the 1970s that homosexual acts began to be 
decriminalised in the Australian states.52  It was only in 1994 that the Australian Capital 
Territory became Australia’s first jurisdiction to acknowledge same-sex couples legally, 
through the Domestic Relationships Act 1994. Thus, referring to historical evidence of what was 
probably in the minds of citizens at the end of the 19th Century,53 it is clear that the common 
conception of marriage was heterosexual. 
 
3.2 CONNOTATION AND DENOTATION 
 
Another orthodox approach is to draw a distinction between the connotation and denotation of a 
term. The connotation is the term’s ‘essential meaning’; the qualities that a thing must have in 
order to come within the term. The denotation refers to all things that have these qualities.54 In 
interpreting the Constitution, the Court is bound only by the connotation. Goldsworthy and 
Meagher have each posited that the connotation of ‘marriage’ in 1900 was ‘formal, 
monogamous, heterosexual unions’; that is, heterosexuality is a core element.55 However, it is 
not clear that the High Court would similarly connote the term, much less take this interpretive 
approach in the first place. 
                                                       
50 198 CLR 511, 553. 
51 (2002) 28 Fam LR 579, 651. 
52 Melissa Bull, Susan Pinto and Paul Richard Wilson, ‘Homosexual law reform in Australia’ (1991) 29 Australian 
Institute of Criminology: Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice, 2. 
53 Attorney-General (Vic); ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 616 (Mason J). 
54 Zines, above n 42, 21. 
55 Goldsworthy, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’, above n 17, 699. Dan Meagher, ‘The Marriage 
Power and Same Sex Unions’ (Paper presented at 2010 Constitutional Law Conference, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of 
Public Law, Art Gallery of NSW, 19 February 2010), 6. 
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Firstly, though well-established, it is a far from universally admired approach.56 There 
are few examples where it has been (at least expressly) utilized, and even then its application 
has been trenchantly questioned.57 Secondly, the distinction between connotation and denotation 
is purely philosophical; there are so many levels of abstraction that it is impossible to hone in on 
the ‘essential’ quality of marriage. The connotation identified by Goldsworthy is debatable; for 
example, given that adultery does not obviate one’s marital status under current law,58 how is 
‘monogamy’ essential? Similarly, as expressed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
‘it is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that marriage must remain a heterosexual 
institution because that is what it historically has been’.59 
This arbitrariness in distinguishing core elements from temporal facts cuts both ways; 
the ability to veil non-originalist tendencies under the guise of this originalist approach is 
discussed below in Section 5.2.1. It is worth noting Kitto J’s assertion that reference to the 
history of earlier legislation to establish the scope of a legislative power is more likely to 
establish the minimum content of a power than its outside limits.60 Similarly, when speaking of 
trade marks in the Union Label Case, Higgins J said: ‘The usage in 1900 gives us the central 
type; it does not give us the circumference of the power’.61 On these principles, it is difficult to 
justify identifying heterosexuality as a core component simply because it was a feature of 
marriage in 1900. 
Finally, if, as discussed below in Section 3.4, marriage is a ‘legal term of art’ – a 
shifting institution as opposed to a readily ascertainable object – it is anathematic to apply the 
connotation/denotation distinction.62  
 
                                                       
56 Zines, above n 42, 21; Dan Meagher, ‘Guided by Voices? – Constitutional Interpretation on the Gleeson Court’, 
above n 18, 266-270; Simon Evans, ‘The Meaning of Constitutional Terms: Essential Features, Family Resemblance 
and Theory-Based Approaches’ (2006) 29 University of NSW Law Journal 207.  
57 Meagher, ‘Guided by Voices? – Constitutional Interpretation on the Gleeson Court’, above n 18, 266-269. 
58 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 48. 
59 Goodridge v Department of Health 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass. 2003), 961 n 23. See also Halpern v Attorney-General 
(Canada) (2003) 225 DLR (4th) 529, 553. 
60 Lansell v Lansell (1964) 110 CLR 353, 363. 
61 Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW (1908) (‘Union Label Case’) 6 CLR 469, 610. 
62 Meagher, ‘Guided by Voices? – Constitutional Interpretation on the Gleeson Court’, above n 18, 272, 286. 
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3.3 TEXTUALISM v INTENTIONALISM 
 
Taking a purposive approach to the Marriage Power does not pasteurize the definitional 
problem. Cole v Whitfield, in its use of the Convention Debates, signalled the High Court’s 
move from textualism to intentionalism.63 Where the former looks only to the words of the 
Constitution to ascertain the Framers’ intent, the latter looks also to extrinsic materials such as 
preparatory debates and previous draft Bills.64 However, with no evidence that the Framers 
turned their minds to the prospect that same-sex couples might ever seek to marry, one cannot 
determine what their intentions would have been in that regard.  
During the Convention Debates, questions of ‘morality and respectability’ were 
discussed.65 For instance, the representatives of the states aside from NSW and Victoria were 
concerned to keep marriage and divorce laws within each colony, for fear of ‘the marital tie 
being dragged down to the level of NSW [and Victoria]’ where recently passed legislation had 
rendered divorce ‘exceedingly easy’ to obtain.66 From its very unfathomability in the late 19th 
Century it is safe conjecture that same-sex marriage would have been seen as scandalous by the 
Framers and raised even more harried concerns. On the other hand, the purpose of including the 
Marriage Power was to ‘make possible uniform national regulation of a vitally important legal 
relationship that underpins family life, child rearing, and therefore social welfare throughout the 
nation’.67 During the Debates, Mr Wise (NSW) asserted that despite differences of religious or 
moral sentiment, it was imperative to ‘always [preserve] such supreme control on behalf of the 
commonwealth as is necessary to prevent scandals from people having one status in one state, 
and another status in another state’.68 
Cole v Whitfield is often seen as applying the ‘common law mischief rule’, but it is 
purely speculative to say that the Framers would have seen greater ‘mischief’ in sanctioning 
                                                       
63 (1988) 165 CLR 360. 
64 Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism’ (1999) 27 Federal Law 
Review 323, 326-328.  
65 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federation Conference (Second Session), Sydney, 22 
September 1897, 1078-1081. 
66 Ibid, 1078 (Mr. Glynn, South Australia). 
67 Goldsworthy, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’, above n 17, 700. 
68 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federation Conference (Second Session), Sydney, 22 
September 1897, 1079. 
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prospective same-sex marriage at the federal level, or conversely in denying Federal Parliament 
power to legislate for same-sex marriages (and hence impeding uniform regulation) had the 
question been adverted to. 
 
3.4 LEGAL TERM OF ART 
 
Federal power to legislate for same-sex marriage may, however, be a possibility if the High 
Court were to take a ‘legal term of art’ approach. This orthodox technique involves recognising 
marriage as a legal institution that, before 1900, was the subject of change by the common law 
and statutes of the United Kingdom and Australian colonies.69 Arguably, to apply the literalist 
strand to a ‘legal term of art’ is erroneous, for legal institutions were still developing (and being 
challenged) when the Constitution was drafted. To consider that their ‘essential meaning’ was 
frozen in 1900 would ‘betray that pre-federation history, the common law tradition and maybe 
even the intentions of the framers’.70 There are strong arguments for recognising marriage as a 
‘legal institution’. Its constituent elements, social purpose and attendant formalities have shifted 
a great deal over time, as this paper will now elucidate. 
Marriage was initially customary, involving a private exchange of mutual promises. It 
became a matter of religious significance when the church and ecclesiastical courts took 
ownership around the time of William the Conqueror.71 In England, the Marriage Act 1753 
made solemnicisation by a priest and witnesses a legal requirement. Designed to prevent 
clandestine unions, the Act gave marriage a civil character whilst recognising the place of 
religious rites.72 These provisions were adopted by NSW in the Marriage Act 1836 and 
remained in force until referral to the Commonwealth in 1961. Many religious aspects of 
marriage were removed with the passing of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).73 
                                                       
69 Brock and Meagher, above n 14, 270. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, 267. 
72 Marriage Act Case (1962) 107 CLR 529, 579 (Windeyer J). 
73 Brock and Meagher, above n 14, 268. 
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The Full Family Court in Re Kevin held that marriage was an evolving, not static, 
institution: 
 
‘[W]e think it is plain that the social and legal institution of marriage as it pertains to Australia 
has undergone transformations that are referable to the environment and period in which the 
particular changes occurred. The concept of marriage therefore cannot, in our view, be correctly 
said to be one that is or ever was frozen in time.’74 
 
Indeed, laws widening the grounds of divorce defy the early conception of marriage as a union 
‘for life’.75 That adultery is no longer a criminal offence corrodes the stringency of ‘to the 
exclusion of all others’. The courts have recognized that the primary purpose of marriage is not, 
as once perceived, procreation.76 While the decision in Re Kevin adhered to the notion of 
marriage as a heterosexual union, the court affirmed that parties to a marriage do not have to be 
biologically capable of having children, by declaring the marriage between a woman and a post-
operative transsexual man to be valid.77 Moreover, since 1975 Australian law has provided no 
basis for invalidating a marriage on any ground relating to consummation or sexual conduct.78 
The Family Court has also acknowledged that the legal term ‘family’ is necessarily broad and 
need not be hetero-nuclear; in Re Patrick a same-sex couple and their child were recognized as 
a ‘family’.79 Same-sex couples are also allowed to adopt in a number of states, and can have 
                                                       
74 Attorney-General (Cth) v Kevin (2003) 30 Fam LR 1, 22 (Nicholson CJ, Ellis and Brown JJ) (emphasis added). 
75 By the time of federation the definition of marriage had already undergone change regarding its once indissoluble 
character. Australian divorce laws, modelled on the UK Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, recognized adultery as the 
only grounds for dissolving a marriage, and wives seeking a divorce had to additionally prove some aggravating 
circumstance such as incest, cruelty or desertion. Although towards the end of the 19th Century NSW and Victoria 
recognized some additional grounds, the notion of divorce was still largely tied to ‘fault’. Grounds of divorce were 
widened even further (to include mere breakdown of a marriage) by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) and the 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth): Geoffrey Lindell, Answers to Questions on Notice to Standing Committee on Social 
Issues (NSW), Inquiry into Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW, 19 March 2013, 8-9. 
76 Attorney-General (Cth) v Kevin (2003) 30 Fam LR 1, 31 (Nicholson CJ, Ellis and Brown JJ). Extra-curially, the 
Honourable Alastair Nicholson has argued that ‘it is not procreation that defines a family relationship, but the 
commitment and financial and emotional interdependence of family members’: The Hon Alastair Nicholson, ‘The 
Changing Concept of family – The Significance of Recognition and Protection’ (1997) 11 Australian Journal of 
Family Law 13, 18.  
77 Attorney-General (Cth) v Kevin (2003) 30 Fam LR 1, 66 (Nicholson CJ, Ellis and Brown JJ). 
78 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 51; Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) ss 23, 23A, 23B. The common law defence to rape 
within marriage has also been rejected: PGA v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355. 
79 Re Patrick: An application concerning contact (2002) 28 Fam LR 579, 650 (Guest J). 
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children through IVF.80 Moreover, federal reforms in 2008 removed provisions from the Family 
Law Act 1975 which discriminated against same-sex parents.81 Significantly, there is also 
popular support; latest polls indicate that 64% of the Australian public are in favour of same-sex 
marriage.82 
These developments illustrate that marriage was and is a changing institution. In the 
contemporary context, both society and the law recognise that marriage may be based on a 
myriad of reasons, including romance, companionship, financial stability and creating or 
supporting a family unit. None of these grounds normatively or in fact disqualify same-sex 
couples.  
 
The Technological/Scientific Development Analogy 
 
In considering the ‘legal term of art’ approach, some authors seek to analogise the Marriage 
Power with construction of powers concerned with technological developments. Indeed, Brock 
and Meagher draw attention to the High Court’s use of the approach in construing the 
Intellectual Property Power s 51(xviii).83 In Grain Pool, the majority said of intellectual 
property rights: 
 
‘Given the cross-currents and uncertainties in the common law and statute at the time of 
federation, it is plainly within the head of power in s 51(xviii) to resolve them. It is also within 
power…to determine that there be fresh rights in the nature of copyright, patents of invention 
and designs and trademarks’.84 
                                                       
80 Same-sex couple adoption was made available in the Australian Capital Territory in 2004, New South Wales in 
2010, and Western Australia in 2002: Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) sch 1 pt 1.2, Adoption Amendment (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2010 (NSW), Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Act 2002 (WA) s 6. South Australia is 
currently the only jurisdiction in Australia to ban fertile single women and lesbians from accessing IVF treatment. 
However, on May 4 2012 the Assisted Reproductive Treatment (Equality of Access) Amendment Bill 2012 (SA) was 
passed by the Legislative Council. The Bill now makes its way to the Legislative Assembly.  
81 Above n 10. 
82 August 2012 (Galaxy poll), up from 57% in December 2011 (Fairfax/Nielsen poll): (Author unknown), ‘Marriage 
equality: the facts’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 29 April 2013 < http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-
news/marriage-equality-the-facts-20130429-2ind6.html>.  
83 Brock and Meagher, above n 14, 270. 
84 The Grain Pool of Western Australia v The Commonwealth (2000) (‘Grain Pool’) 202 CLR 479, 501 (emphasis 
added). 
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Even though changes to marriage pertain to cultural and social values rather than technological 
or scientific development, marriage has similarly been viewed as a ‘recognisable but not 
immutable institution’.85 However, though useful, it is by no means a conclusive analogy, for 
two reasons. 
Firstly, as pointed out in Grain Pool, the ‘special reason’ why no narrow approach 
could apply to the Intellectual Property Power is that ‘a universal feature of the twentieth 
century [was] the dynamic progress and momentum of science and technology’.86 While the 
principal inventions of the century were for the most part undiscovered or unforeseen, ‘…the 
Constitution certainly envisaged that the Commonwealth was entering an age of special 
technological inventiveness’.87 So much is evident in the provision of s 51(v) in wide terms: 
‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services’.88 Thus, construing future (even 
unforeseeable) technological developments as coming under the s 51(v) head of power is 
consistent with originalism.89 S 51(xxi), however is not formulated as explicitly contemplating 
the inclusion of future developments. Although the marriage institution had been through many 
social and cultural developments, it cannot be said to have the same degree of ‘dynamism’ as 
technological developments, let alone a dynamism explicitly recognized by the Constitution. 
Secondly, those objects identified in s 51(xviii) did not have a settled meaning at the time the 
Constitution was enacted. For example, the question of whether ‘patents’ needed to be a 
physical product, or could just be a process that produced a useful result, was still awaiting final 
decision.90 Marriage, on the other hand, had a certain legal definition in 1900. 
However, there is a clear difference between heads of power dealing with ‘concrete, 
physical objects’ where ‘the boundaries of the class are fixed by external nature’ (such as 
lighthouses or railways)91 and ‘artificial products of society’, as Higgins J pointed out in the 
                                                       
85 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, 404 (Dawson J). 
86 (2000) 202 CLR 479, 131 (Kirby J). 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Goldsworthy ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’, above n 17, 695. 
90 This question was not settled until the judgement in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner 
of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252.  
91 Constitution s 51(vii), s 51(xxxii). 
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Union Label Case, and the Court acknowledged in Grain Pool.92 It is thus more appropriate to 
treat the Marriage Power, concerning as it does an artificial socio-legal construct, similarly to 
powers over other social constructs like trade marks; as ‘involving a power to alter those rights, 
to define those rights, to limit those rights, to extend those rights, and to extend the class of 
those who may enjoy those rights.’93 Indeed, Higgins J characterized the Intellectual Property 
Power as akin to the Marriage Power and suggested that ‘Parliament could prescribe what 
unions are to be regarded as marriages’.94 
This is not to condone the stream rising above the source. As Higgins J himself stated, a 
single constitutional term is ‘not a peg on which Parliament may hang legislation’.95 It is, 
however, to acknowledge that the source of the marriage definition is not set in 1900; 
Parliament could extend the marriage institution to same-sex couples in line with the 
contemporary conception. Furthermore, if Federal Parliament did legalise same-sex marriage, a 
presumption in favour of constitutionality would arise under the ‘legal term of art’ approach, 
because legislation would represent a consensus throughout Australia as to the legitimacy and 
morality of same-sex marriage.96  
Social institutions are not always interpreted under the auspices of ‘legal term of art’. 
Indeed, strands of moderate originalism akin to this technique have been invoked to interpret 
constructs such as ‘trial by jury’ and ‘aliens’. These approaches will be explored in Section 5.2. 
 
3.5 ORIGINALISM v NON-ORIGINALISM 
 
In looking not only to which interpretive approaches facilitate a reading of s 51(xxi) as granting 
Federal Parliament power to legislate for same-sex marriage, but also which are appropriate to 
                                                       
92 Union Label Case (1908) 6 CLR 469, 611 (Higgins J); Grain Pool (2000) 202 CLR 479, 19 (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
93 Union Label Case (1908) 6 CLR 469, 611 (Higgins J), cited with approval in Grain Pool (2000) 202 CLR 479, 
494 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).  
94 Union Label Case (1908) 6 CLR 469, 610. 
95 Ex parte Walsh & Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36, 117. 
96 Brock and Meagher, above n 14, 272. On the presumption see Stenhouse v Coleman (1994) 69 CLR 457, 466 
(Starke J); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180 (Isaacs J); Attorney-General (Vic); 
Ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 267 (Dixon J); Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 
161 (Murphy J); Henry Burmester, ‘The Presumption of Constitutionality’ (1983) 13 Federal Law Review 277. 
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reading the head of power, it is worth noting some general arguments of the originalist v non-
originalist debate. These will only be referred to briefly, as they are already well-canvassed in 
the literature.97 
Firstly, some argue that strict originalism is the only appropriate role for the (unelected 
and unrepresentative) judiciary to take; judges should not refer to consequences or policy 
considerations.98 However, in practice, neutral interpretation is impossible. The sparseness of 
the Constitution and indeterminacy of language mean that interpretation will necessarily involve 
policy and external considerations.99 ‘Marriage’ as a constitutional concept is difficult to define, 
not least because same-sex marriage was an unforeseen prospect in 1900. This ambiguity 
undermines Kay’s contention that originalism is ‘most likely to produce relatively clear and 
stable rules’.100 
Another argument for original intent is that the Constitution itself prescribes a method 
of change; if the contemporary landscape or values are so out of step with the 1900 meaning to 
warrant alteration, the appropriate course to hold a referendum. However, there are strong 
counter-arguments against reliance on s 128: a referendum can only be brought about by the 
Commonwealth; is arguably inappropriate for minority rights issues; and referendums have a 
poor record of success, often put down to the difficulties in fairly formulating the question to be 
put to the people.101 
Ultimately, the Constitution applies to a fundamentally different Australia from the one 
in the minds of the Framers and people at its conception. Like the Race Power s 51(xxvi) whose 
clearly racially discriminatory sentiments are no longer acceptable, the Marriage Power s 
51(xxi) if interpreted in a strict originalist light bears an anachronistic pall deeply incongruous 
for a document which is intended to endure. Whilst one cannot dismiss the arguments for 
originalism, it is also important to consider non-originalist interpretive techniques. 
                                                       
97 See especially Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’ above n 42; Goldsworthy ‘Interpreting 
the Constitution in its Second Century’ above n 17; Kirk, above n 64; Leslie Zines, ‘Dead Hands or Living Tree? 
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Responses’ (1988) 82 Northwestern University Law Review 226, 288. 
101 Kirk, above n 64, 352-353. 
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4 NON-ORIGINALISM 
 
The non-originalist interpretive approach is predicated on the Constitution being a document 
that is ‘intended to endure for ages to come, and adapt to various crises of human affairs’.102 
Thus, it is said that interpretation should take account of the ‘conditions, needs, practices, 
preferences, expectations and standards of modern times’,103 and does not depend on the 
Framers’ intentions.104  Such a dynamic or progressive interpretation, which compels the Court 
to the broader construction unless there is something to indicate otherwise,105 would likely 
facilitate a reading of s 51(xxi) as giving Federal Parliament the power to legislate for same-sex 
marriage.106 However, while policy concerns and questions of social consequence and morality 
will inevitably inform the constitutional interpretation, the High Court is unlikely to explicitly 
espouse non-originalism, as it is has been negatively associated with ‘judicial activism’.  
The originalist orthodoxy has dominated the Australian constitutional scene; indeed, 
there is no similarly strong tradition of non-originalist interpretation. Its strongest proponents 
are Justices Kirby, Mason and Deane, though the latter’s oft quoted passage from Theophanous 
referring to Framer Andrew Inglis Clark’s vision of the Constitution as a ‘living force’ rather 
than ‘a lifeless declaration of the will and intentions of men long since dead’107 is tempered by a 
closer reading of Clark which suggests that he was essentially an originalist.108 The very fact of 
s 51(xxi) being a constitutional provision suggests some impermeability against vicissitudes. 
However, the term ‘marriage’ defies an essentialist definition, and same-sex marriage was 
                                                       
102 McCulloch v Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), 415 (Marshall CJ). See also Union Label Case (1908) 6 
CLR 469, 612 (Higgins J); Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29, 81 (Dixon J). 
103 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation’ (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 1, 5, 23. 
104 Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’, above n 42, 35. 
105 Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 367-8 (O’Connor J). 
106 This was the approach taken in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698 by which the Canadian 
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Amendment Act 2004 (Cth)’ above n 36, 36. 
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108 Kirk, above n 64, 333; Goldsworthy ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’, above n 42, 17. Before the 
passages quotes by Deane J, Clark said: ‘It has been repeatedly stated that the fundamental rule for the interpretation 
of a written law is to follow the intention of the makers of it as they have disclosed it in the language in which they 
have declared the law’: Andrew Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (1901), 21-22. 
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unforeseen by the Framers. As demonstrated above in Section 3, originalism does not provide a 
clear response as to how to resolve this ambiguity. 
 
4.1 DYNAMIC / PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION 
 
The Honourable Justice Michael Kirby has expressed irritation with sometimes tortured 
attempts to reconcile the needs of contemporary society with the Framers’ intentions, deriding 
the search for original intention as a form of ‘ancestor worship’.109 In Grain Pool he vehemently 
declared that upon enactment the words of the Constitution were: ‘set free from the framers’ 
intentions…The words gain their legitimacy and legal force from the fact that they appear in the 
Constitution; not from how they were conceived by the framers a century ago’.110 He added that 
he did not believe discernment of the 1900 meaning was ‘crucial or even important’.111 On his 
approach, where the Constitution is ambiguous, the Court should adopt a meaning in line with 
principles of universal and fundamental rights.112 In Kartinyeri v Commonwealth, for example, 
which concerned the scope of the (amended) Race Power, Gaudron J said it was difficult to 
fathom circumstances in which a law which operated to disadvantage a racial minority would be 
upheld as valid.113 
In order to discern the state of ‘contemporary values’, non-originalists may advert to 
principles reflected in international law (although this is somewhat controversial),114 foreign 
law, domestic law, as well as policy concerns. 
4.1.1 International Law 
In terms of international law, Australia is a State Party to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), which includes Article 23 ‘the right of men and women of 
marriageable age to marry’, Article 2 ‘non-discrimination in enjoyment of the rights protected 
                                                       
109 The Hon Justice Michael Kirby, above n 20. 
110 (2000) 202 CLR 479, 523. 
111 Ibid, 525. 
112 Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 417. See also Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth 
(1997) 190 CLR 513, 657 (Kirby J). 
113 (1998) 195 CLR 337, 365-366. 
114 Historically, various judges have used international law in constitutional interpretation. However, more recently, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ have been critical of the use of international law in this way: Kristen Walker, ‘International 
Law as a Tool of Constitutional Interpretation’ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 85.  
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by the ICCPR’, and Article 26 ‘all persons are “equal before the law” and receive “equal 
protection of the law”’. Similar provisions are found in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (‘UDHR’) Articles 16 and 7.  
In the case of Toonen v Australia, Tasmania’s sodomy laws were examined by the UN 
Human Rights Committee (‘UNHRC’) and deemed to be a breach of the ICCPR privacy 
provision Article 17.115 The Committee noted that the reference to ‘sex’ in Articles 2 and 26 is 
to be taken as including sexual orientation, but explicitly declined to make a finding that there 
had been a breach of Article 26.116 In Joslin v New Zealand, the UNHRC held that a signatory 
state’s refusal to enable same-sex couples to marry did not violate the ICCPR provisions.117 In 
particular, they stated that Article 23, being the only substantive Covenant provision to use 
‘men and women’ rather than general terms such as ‘all persons’, has facilitated a consistent and 
uniform understanding that the right extends only to heterosexual marriage.118 Though not 
binding, the Committee’s views are persuasive.119 However, one can question whether the case 
would be decided the same way today, more than a decade later. At the time of the Joslin 
decision, only the Netherlands had legalised same-sex marriage. Since then, 13 countries have 
done so, and more seem set to follow. It is also interesting to note that when Australia’s human 
rights record was scrutinized as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic 
Review in 2011, Australia’s failure to enact same-sex marriage legislation was honed in on as 
an area of concern.120 Today, the ICCPR and UDHR provisions may be seen as extending the 
right to marry to all persons, regardless of gender or sexual orientation.121  
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At this point it is worth noting a separate head of power which the High Court is likely 
to consider in its adjudication of Federal competency to legislate for same-sex marriage. An 
argument might be raised that Federal Parliament has the requisite power under the treaty 
component of the External Affairs Power s 51(xxix); that is, same-sex marriage legislation 
would be a proportionate discharge of Australia’s equality and non-discrimination obligations 
under the ICCPR.122 However, this is a less than secure foothold as the ICCPR offers no explicit 
protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Moreover, to be valid under s 
51(xxix), the domestic law must have a clear and proportionate relationship to the international 
obligation. George Williams and Andrew Lynch suggest that Federal Parliament may be able to 
outlaw discrimination on the basis of sexuality, but it is probably going too far to positively 
legislate for same-sex marriage under this head of power.123 
4.1.2 Foreign Law 
Returning to the non-originalist interpretation of s 51(xxi), the Court may be able to 
look to foreign law, as more and more countries enact same-sex marriage legislation. However, 
this is problematic in that some 180 nations still have not enacted same-sex marriage legislation 
(and many lack more basic equality laws), and Australia’s federal system and lack of Bill of 
Rights preclude any close analogies being drawn to those that have.124  
4.1.3 Domestic Law 
Finally, the Court could look to domestic values of equality as informing the scope of 
‘contemporary values’. Notably, all Australian states and territories prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation.125 Moreover, an aspect of liberal democracy and the rule of law 
is that all Australians should have equality before the law.126 It might be argued that an 
interpretation of s 51(xxi) which precludes Federal Parliament from legislating for same-sex 
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marriage defies Australia’s contemporary aversion to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  
Overall, by determining ‘contemporary values’ by reference to principles of 
international, foreign and domestic law, a non-originalist perspective may well facilitate a 
reading of s 51(xxi) as encompassing same-sex marriage. 
4.1.4 Policy Concerns 
From a functionalist perspective, non-originalist arguments have tended to surface 
when practical consequences are discussed, as in Koowarta and the Tasmanian Dam Case 
which addressed the modern realm of international relations.127 The Marriage Power debate 
involves serious policy concerns, almost necessitating a non-originalist analysis. If the s 51(xxi) 
power is limited to heterosexual marriage, it places same-sex marriage in the States’ purview. 
Patrick Parkinson cogently reasons that State Bills purporting to allow same-sex couples to 
marry actually create a new status of ‘same sex marriage’. In order to avoid inconsistency with 
the Federal Marriage Act (see Section 2.1.2), State legislation would have to shy away from 
labelling unions between same-sex couples as ‘marriage’. That is, their validity would hinge on 
establishing a legal relationship that is sufficiently different from that recognized by the 
Marriage Act.128 This creates two problems. 
Firstly, that of symbolism. State law cannot offer same-sex couples access to the 
cultural richness of federally-recognised ‘marriage’, merely a ‘skim milk’ version. In 
(necessarily) differentiating between heterosexual and homosexual couples, there is a danger of 
perpetuating discrimination and exclusion. 
Secondly, a State law would ‘create a hybrid status, being a kind of “marriage” with its 
own unique set of rules for limited purposes under [State law], and a de facto relationship in 
federal law and in the law of other states and territories. Under some circumstances it may be 
neither a marriage nor a de facto relationship in federal law’.129 This would create confusion, as 
same-sex couples would be on a different relationship register from heterosexual couples, and 
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would go through a different divorce process.130 Marriage celebrants would need to apply for 
special authorization to conduct a ‘same-sex marriage’.131 The issue of subsequent marriage is 
also murky: the South Australian Bill, for example, seemed to allow a person to be married 
under both its own terms and the Marriage Act; the Tasmanian Bill voided a same-sex marriage 
if a subsequent federally-recognised marriage was entered into (thus conferring an inferior 
status on same-sex marriage).132 
Finally, same-sex marriages entered into in one State would only be recognized and 
dissolvable in that State.133 As put by Geoffrey Lindell: ‘[T]he last thing we want to encourage 
is the notion of limping marriages which are recognised in some jurisdictions and not others. 
Parties to such relationships should be certain about their status wherever they reside in 
Australia or for that matter the rest of the world.’134  
Under a non-originalist approach, these functional policy concerns tend to the 
conclusion that s 51(xxi) should include competence to legislate for same-sex marriage. Even 
on an originalist approach, the prospect of a disharmonious body of state legislation might 
reasonably be considered to defy the Framers’ intention to allow for the development of a 
uniform marriage and divorce system.135 However, it is not definitive, as Australia’s federal 
system often produces legislation on a state-by-state basis until it prompts uniform national 
action; this is envisaged by the States’ referral power. 
 
4.2 DANGERS OF NON-ORIGINALISM 
 
One must be mindful of the dangers in applying the non-originalist approach. Sir Daryl Dawson 
has said that ‘[t]he metaphor of a living tree does nothing to tell the judge where he should 
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allow growth to take place or where he should apply the pruning knife’.136 Indeed, turning to 
universal principles where there is textual ‘ambiguity’ is unhelpful in that all constitutional 
provisions require a degree of interpretation. It also offers little guidance when there are various 
(potentially contrasting) principles of international, foreign and domestic law, and competing 
social values and policy considerations. This attracts arguments that the judiciary should not be 
the body weighing these competing values; they are unelected and unrepresentative of the 
Australian people.  
Goldsworthy has vigorously criticized Kirby J’s approach as ‘radical non-
originalism’;137 that dangerously, it may construe the Constitution in line with any modern sense 
that serves good government. He suggests that on Kirby J’s approach, all the Court has to work 
with are (1) the words of the Constitution, (2) its own earlier decisions interpreting those words 
(which are then put aside because earlier decisions based on originalist reasoning are of little 
weight) and (3) its perceptions of contemporary values and governmental needs.138 Radical 
readings, while not inevitable, are not ruled out. However, this perhaps misrepresents the 
approach; in its application Kirby J did consider the ‘history, purpose and language’ of 
constitutional terms.139 Thus he declined to interpret a parallel to the s 51 phrase ‘peace order 
and good government’ in the NSW Constitution Act as a substantive limitation on Parliament’s 
powers, which some judges in the NSW Court of Appeal would have done in spite of judicial 
history signifying plenary power.140 He also referred to the Convention Debates and historical 
context to flesh out the meaning of s 47 of the Constitution regarding disputed elections.141 
Indeed, Kirby J’s approach does not aim ‘to defeat the intention of the Constitution and its 
framers. On the contrary, it [aims] to achieve its high and enduring governmental purposes’.142  
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In reality, the ‘slippery slope’ argument does not hold in interpreting the Marriage (or 
any other) Power. The Court cannot have wanton reference to capricious values or 
circumstances; the arguments that same-sex marriage might be encompassed by the term 
‘marriage’ are based on a perception of strong, established social recognition (see Section 3.4). 
Appropriating Bill Maher’s humorous take on same-sex marriage to the constitutional setting: 
 
‘[Recognition of same-sex marriage] is not a slippery slope to [recognition of] rampant inter-
species coupling. When women got the right to vote, it didn’t lead to hamsters voting. No court 
has extended the equal protection clause to salmon…’143 
 
Clearly marriage cannot refer to anything. Non-originalism seeks a pragmatic solution to the 
needs of contemporary society which reliance on original intention cannot offer. Indeed, an 
analogy may be drawn to constitutional interpretation of the ‘voting franchise’, for which even 
more cautious judges partly accepted the ‘evolving meaning’ thesis.144 Whilst ‘the people’ 
would originally have referred to men (of certain qualification) and non-Indigenous persons, in 
Langer v Commonwealth, McHugh J construed ‘the people’ as an abstraction ‘whose content 
will change from time to time’.145  In McGinty v Western Australia, Brennan J accepted that the 
franchise has historically expanded in scope such that it is ‘at least arguable that the 
qualifications of age, sex, race and property which limited the franchise in earlier times could 
not now be reimposed so as to deprive a citizen of the right to vote’.146 To construe ‘marriage’ 
as applying only to heterosexual marriages may be as incongruous as construing the voting 
franchise as applying only to non-Indigenous, propertied men. 
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5 MIDDLE WAYS 
 
There are undoubtedly great theoretical differences between the original intention and 
progressivist doctrines; the former privileges the meaning of constitutional terms as understood 
in 1900 and intended by the Framers, the latter aims to interpret the Constitution in a way 
amenable to the needs and values of modern society. However, in reality most decisions will 
take account of both imperatives. This is because ‘the tension between stability and change 
exists under either view’.147 Attempts to interpret s 51(xxi) exemplify this tension, as the power 
deals with an historically rich and enduring institution, which is nevertheless subject to much 
social and cultural change. What other approaches, which combine the original intention and 
progressivist methodologies, might the High Court then utilize? 
Goldsworthy and Kirk canvas a number of methods for giving the Constitution a more 
flexible operation, including (1) ‘non-literal, purposive interpretation’ and (2) ‘underlying non-
originalism’, under which ‘connotation and denotation’ and ‘context-dependent criteria’ are 
explored. Typecast under the banner of ‘moderate originalism’, their starting point is 
originalism, because ‘the most basic principle of statutory interpretation is the adoption of an 
originalist approach’.148 The process of evolution is then guided by the original, intended 
meaning.149 
 
5.1 NON-LITERAL, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION 
 
Whereas an originalist approach post-Cole v Whitfield would look to extrinsic materials to 
discern the Framers’ intention as to the same-sex marriage question (which is obviously 
deficient), the ‘non-literal, purposive interpretation’ considers the ‘spirit rather than [the] letter’ 
of the text more broadly.150 For example, the United States Constitution gives Congress the 
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power to raise ‘Armies’ and ‘a Navy’, and to regulate ‘the land and naval Forces’.151 Air forces 
were unforeseen when the Constitution was enacted, and would not come within the 
connotation of ‘Armies’ or ‘Navies’, which are defined as land and sea-based forces.152 
However, Congress is regarded as having the power to raise air forces because the purpose of 
the provision is clearly to allow Congress to have complete control over the country’s military 
forces.153 
Applying the analogy, the ultimate purpose of the Marriage Power was to make 
possible uniform national regulation of the legal relationship. During the Debates, the 
Honourable RE O’Connor (NSW) cited this imperative: ‘We want to bring about not only a 
recognition of the status, but a uniformity of the laws in regard to marriage and divorce…’.154 
Even the representatives of South Australia and Tasmania, who sought to retain significant State 
control over the institution for the time being, concurred. As The Honourable CH Grant (Tas) 
said, ‘[It] might be provided that the federal parliament, having the assent of the states, should 
eventually; have the power to evolve a uniform law of marriage’.155 The Honourable Sir JW 
Downer (SA) asked with rhetorical vehemence, ‘What subject is more fitted for general 
legislation? In what subject do we want a universal law more than that dealing with the most 
sacred relations that concern not merely the individuals who are parties to the contract…but also 
those who are to come afterwards?’156 
The current NSW Inquiry, introduction of 5 Federal and 3 State Bills, and international 
climate strongly suggest that same-sex marriage legislation is an inevitability. Its uniform 
regulation requires Commonwealth legislation, and this can be achieved by construing s 51(xxi) 
is a way consistent with the Founders’ pragmatic purpose.  
It is important to note that the purpose of s 51(xxi) was not to delineate what marriage 
was. A moralistic purpose; for example, to prevent polygamous, even consanguineal marriages; 
could have been expressed by inserting a definition of marriage. Rather, the Framers left it to 
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the Parliaments to flesh out not only the formalities of solemnicisation, but also the pre-requisite 
conditions for marriageability.   
Finally, it is worth noting that the case is less contrived than the United States military 
force analogy; the latter requires a distinct departure from the literal words (it invokes a ghost 
addendum ‘and air forces’), but same-sex marriage would in the contemporary setting literally 
come within the formulation ‘marriage’. 
 
5.2 UNDERLYING NON-ORIGINALISM 
 
5.2.1 Connotation and Denotation 
 
The Honourable Justice Michael Kirby has said that resort to formulae such as 
‘connotation and denotation’ may sometimes disguise rather than clarify the real reasons why 
one choice is preferred in a particular case and another is rejected.157 Indeed, applying a high 
level of generality to the connotation of a constitutional term can produce very wide results, and 
essentially mask a progressivist reading. By ostensibly adverting to the Framers’ intended 
meaning, the interpretation appears to fall within originalism.  
An example can be seen in the Court’s interpretation in Cheatle v R of the s 80 
guarantee of a ‘trial…by jury’ for federal indictable offences.158 It is particularly apt for the s 
51(xxi) debate, because both relate to cultural/social shifts and the attendant policy concerns. In 
1900, jurors had to be propertied men. The Court fixed upon ‘representative of the wider 
community’ as the essential feature of the institution.159 Clearly, excluding women and 
unpropertied men would not be appropriate for the modern day. However, the Court chose to 
characterize the institution at an abstract level without explaining why that level was chosen, 
rather than profess to taking a non-originalist approach.  
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Also illustrating the flexibility of the ‘connotation and denotation’ approach are the 
cases which considered the ‘naturalization and aliens’ power s 51(xix). The Framers considered 
aliens to be non-British subjects.160 In Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 
‘aliens’ were defined at a high level of abstraction; essentially, as citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state.161 The Court considered Britain to be such a foreign state at least since enactment 
of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, and so non-citizen British subjects were aliens within s 
51(xix).162 This interpretation clearly fits contemporary needs, taking into account the 
development of Australian sovereignty and citizenship, and the Crown’s shift to a national 
(rather than imperial) office. However, no theoretical reasoning was given to explain why 
‘foreign state’ as opposed to ‘non-British Empire’ was considered connotative.163  
Similarly, one could dismiss the Lord Penzance qualifier of ‘a man and a woman’ as 
part of the denotation of ‘marriage’. By connoting marriage as ‘the union of two people 
voluntarily entered into for life’, one could still claim to adhere to the ‘essential elements’ as 
conceived by the Framers. Indeed, this could be extended even further; for example, if 
contemporary values called for fixed-term marriages, ‘for life’ might be considered denotative.  
 
5.2.2 Context-Dependent Criteria 
 
A parallel approach is that of ‘context-dependent criteria’.164 In Re Wakim; Ex parte 
McNally, McHugh J said that many constitutional terms ‘are expressed at such a level of 
generality that the most sensible conclusion to be drawn from their use in a Constitution is that 
the makers…intended that they should apply to whatever facts and circumstances succeeding 
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generations thought they covered.’165 Their essential feature is an abstract concept, dependent on 
the common perception. He gave examples including the power to make laws with respect to 
‘trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth’ s 51(xx), 
‘conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one State’ s 51(xxxv), and ‘external affairs’ s 51(xxix).166 Indeed, in 
WA National Football League, Mason J asserted that the words ‘trading corporation’ were 
intended to refer to ‘such corporations as should from time to time be described as trading 
corporations’.167 In R v Coldham, ‘industrial disputes’ was given its ‘popular meaning’ as a 
‘question of fact’.168  In Koowarta, Stephen J asserted that matters ‘generally regarded at any 
particular time’ as being of international concern come within the scope of the external affairs 
power.169 
Use of this approach has been limited. McHugh J stated that the level of abstraction for 
some constitutional words is much harder to identify, and pointed to ‘marriage’ as an example. 
However, while Goldsworthy asserts a paucity of ‘relative terms’ in the Constitution,170 Kirk 
suggests that a careful reading produces a lengthy list of context-dependent criteria.171 It is 
difficult to see why s 51(xxi) would be precluded from this list. Firstly, it seems arbitrary to 
affix a level of abstraction to any provision (aside from s 92 which has an historical meaning). 
Even the archetype of ‘thing with fixed external boundaries’, the lighthouse, might require a 
progressivist interpretation if in the future lighthouses were replaced by a different system for 
guiding sea vessels.172 Secondly, the Convention Debates evidence the Framers’ view of 
marriage as contingent on community values. Mr Wise (NSW) said that ‘…in all social 
questions such…as marriage, each community might be allowed to legislate according to its 
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own ideas of right and wrong…’.173 Though speaking to geographical and religious difference 
rather than temporality, he acknowledged social context-dependency. The Honourable CH 
Grant (Tas) also spoke about federal parliament ‘evolv[ing] an [sic] uniform law of marriage’.174 
If we were to frame ‘marriage’ as a term whose dynamic operation was intended by the 
Framers, it could be interpreted as ‘such unions/legal relationships as should from time to time 
be described as marriages’ and hence encompass same-sex marriage if Federal Parliament were 
to legislate for it. 
 The ambiguities of this approach are apparent. What is required or valued by modern 
society is not, as claimed in R v Coldham, a matter of fact. Rather, it requires the High Court to 
make a choice. One approach to this ‘choice’ is illustrated by Gaudron J’s dissent in Nolan, 
where she said in respect of s 51(xxix): ‘For most purposes it is convenient to identify an alien 
by reference to the want or absence of the criterion which determines membership of that 
community.’175 In noting that it was not until the 1987 amendment that the definition of an 
‘alien’ as a ‘non-British subject, Irish citizen or protected person’ was removed from the 
Citizenship Act, Gaudron J contended that the Act’s definition could not control the 
constitutional meaning of ‘alien’, but could, until its repeal in 1987, serve to identify those 
whom the Parliament had legislated to recognize as members of the Australian community.176 
This view was adopted by the majority in Re Patterson to overturn Nolan, such that it held that 
a British subject in essentially the same position as Nolan was not an alien and could not be 
deported.177 Applying Gaudron’s approach to s 51(xxi), the High Court might use the Marriage 
Act as the ‘time to time’ descriptor which serves to identify those who are qualified to marry. 
Obviously then, the argument for including same-sex marriage in the Marriage Power hinges on 
Federal Parliament amending the Marriage Act. 
There are great difficulties in referring to Australian legislation to give meaning to 
constitutional concepts like ‘alien’ or ‘marriage’. Indeed, in Re Patterson, Kirby J pointed out 
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that to take into account amendments to the Citizenship Act ran contrary to Gibbs CJ’s reproach, 
with which many other judges have concurred, that Parliament cannot provide its own definition 
of ‘alien’ for the purposes of s 51(xix).178 This follows the renowned assertion in Australian 
Communist Party v Commonwealth that Parliament cannot ‘recite itself into power’.179 
However, where the original meaning at 1900 is no longer appropriate, and some degree of 
judicial choice must factor, domestic legislation is, like international law and evidence of public 
opinion, indicative of contemporary conceptions. Indeed, Brock and Meagher assert that the 
‘democratic credentials’ of potential Federal legislation allowing same-sex marriage are 
important, ‘especially…if such legislation were to be enacted pursuant to a conscience vote in 
Parliament’.180 This is because it would reflect a national consensus as to ‘the morality and 
legitimacy of same-sex marriage…The presumption in favour of constitutionality ought to be at 
its strongest when federal legislation determines complex and intractable moral issues of this 
kind’.181 However, it is important to note that Gaudron J’s focus on federal legislation is but one 
option under the ‘context-dependent criteria’ approach. The High Court might also or 
alternatively look to other factors (such as other domestic legislation, international law, foreign 
law and public opinion as discussed in Sections 3.4 and 4.1) as indicative of contemporary 
values. Normatively, duly considering and weighing each of these factors is the preferable 
course.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
As more and more States seek to push through same-sex marriage legislation, and 
pressure mounts on the Federal Government to amend the Marriage Act, it becomes ever more 
apparent that a High Court judgment on the scope of the Marriage Power is in the offing. 
Whether the High Court will interpret s 51(xxi) as encompassing the power to legislate for 
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same-sex marriage is very much an open question, for in matters of constitutional interpretation, 
‘much depends upon the particular question to be resolved and the concatenation of factors 
which may be relevant to it’.182 More specifically, much depends on which interpretive 
approach(es) the judges choose to take, and how they weigh the attendant factors. 
This paper has considered originalist, non-originalist and middle-way approaches to 
constitutional interpretation. The literalist and intentionalist strands of originalism, focussed as 
they are on the common understanding of ‘marriage’ in 1900, would not construe s 51(xxi) as 
encompassing same-sex marriage. The converse is most likely true of a dynamic non-originalist 
approach, which aims to ensure that the Constitution accommodates contemporary community 
values and policy concerns. This paper has also demonstrated the potential for subversion; the 
‘connotation and denotation’ approach may facilitate a non-originalist reading under the guise 
of originalism. However, it is not advocated because it is philosophically problematic and non-
prescriptive. 
The Marriage Power is uniquely complex, because same-sex marriage was a completely 
unforeseen concept at the time of constitutional enactment. Consequently, to apotheosize 
original intent would be absurd. It thus seems inevitable that the Court will give credence to the 
modern context. However, non-originalism entails the theoretical danger of radical readings, 
although a close analysis of even Kirby J’s dynamic approach shows that historical context and 
the Framers’ intentions will rarely (if ever) be ignored as completely irrelevant. The problem of 
interpreting s 51(xxi) is thus best resolved by an approach which invokes both originalism and 
non-originalism.  
Taking a step back, one can conflate the ‘legal term of art’, ‘context-dependent criteria’ 
and ‘non-literal purposive’ interpretive approaches. All consider original intent by construing s 
51(xxi), in its generality and evolving subject matter, as intended to be dependent on social 
understandings. They then invoke factors such as domestic legislation, international values, 
foreign law and public opinion to flesh out ‘contemporary community values’. Provided that 
they acknowledge the necessary invocation of judicial choice (in the interest of transparency), 
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this goes some way to ameliorating the raging tension between originalism’s anachronism, and 
non-originalism’s instability and seeming unboundedness. 
The socio-political debate teems, and with a paucity of High Court guidance on the 
scope of s 51(xxi), the legal debate remains unpasteurised. Some years ago, Geoffrey Lindell 
hypothesised that the longer the same-sex marriage issue is postponed for decision, the greater 
the chances of its eventual acceptance.183 Indeed, the more time that passes, the more public 
support that is garnered. More countries recognise same-sex marriage, and more compelling are 
the arguments that this is representative of contemporary values. Continuing on this trajectory, 
it seems that when the High Court does come to determine the scope of s 51(xxi), it may well 
rule that Federal Parliament does have the power to legislate for same-sex marriage, and offer 
‘full-cream marriage’ to Australian couples regardless of sexual orientation. 
                                                       
183 Lindell, ‘State legislative power to enact same-sex marriage legislation, and the effect of the Marriage Act 1961 
(Cth) as amended by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth)’, above n 36, 29. 
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